World-System analysis came into being in the 1970s, when U.S. global power was being challenged seriously in the aftermath of its Vietnam War defeat and the run on the dollar following the dissolution of the Bretton Woods gold standard. In this context, the analysis of hegemonic decline in the capitalist world-system became a core theme of discussion among leading world system analysts. In the classical Wallersteinian formulation, capitalist world-system differed from premodern world empires in that the core of the system is divided among competitive states, and one of these states performed a hegemonic role at a given time period. Sixteenth-century Dutch, nineteenth-century UK, and twentieth-century US were the hegemonic states of the respective periods, enjoying commercial, political and military primacies and setting the rule of the game for other states to follow. These primacies, nevertheless, were destined to decline after they peaked, and the world-system would be pushed into a period of inter-core rivalry in which competing core states competed to become the next hegemon. To the world-systemists, the challenges that the US faced in the 1970s signaled the beginning of the decline of the US hegemony, which emerged amidst the chaos of the two world wars (Wallerstein 1984; 1974) .
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To Wallerstein, the capitalist world-system has reached its limit of expansion, and the crisis of U.S. hegemony is equivalent to the crisis of the system itself, and such crisis will ultimately lead to the end of the capitalist system as we know it. (Wallerstein 1979) Others who loosely follow a world-system perspective, on the other hand, assume the contest for the throne of new hegemony would proceed as usual, and they are keen to look for candidates of the next hegemon, with Germany (Europe), Japan, and China as the favorite at different times. Likewise, according to more recent works by Arrighi (1994; 2007) and Arrighi and Silver (1999) , the trajectory of the end of American hegemony will likely depart from earlier hegemonic declines, and the world-system is likely to face one of the three scenarios: the dawn of protracted systemic chaos and warfare, the rise of a more egalitarian world market society let by emerging powers in Asia, and the rise of a coercive US-centered global empire.
In the theorization of the current transition and prediction of what may happen in the future of the world-system, most discussion were constrained by the limited number of cases of hegemony and hegemonic transitions. With the Dutch and UK hegemonies as the only two precedents from which we could generalize, our imagination about what is happening and what will happen amidst U.S. hegemonic decline is seriously limited. In this regard, Christopher ChaseDunn's discovery of a wide range of premodern world-systems that follow similar dynamics of core-periphery division of labor and interstate competition or integration is a significant contribution to the debate. Itvastly expands the number of cases available for comparison, therefore leading us to a whole new range of possibilities to ponder at. At the same time, Chase-Dunn and his team's efforts to look for quantitative indicators to measure the development and cycle of world-system empirically also complement the narrative-based analysis of most other worldsystemists, enabling us to decipher past patterns, even within our current capitalist world-system, that has been overlooked before.
Semi-periphery Marcher State or Second Hegemony of the Hegemon?
In Chase-Dunn's works on premodern world systems, he outlines the different formations of world-systems that coexisted and were linked to one another at different extents and levels -e.g. politico-military interaction and prestige goods trading -fall short of full-scale integration into one singular system. Sharing the common feature of a core-periphery division of labor, the core region of these system might be governed by a single imperial state, or it may be divided into competing core states. The modern capitalist world-system is no more than a special, globally encompassing case of these world-systems, and all these systems follow some similar fundamental dynamics. (see Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997) As such, Chase-Dunn and his collaborators have elevated world-system analysis to a new level, allowing us to transgress within-system comparison based on a singular system and move on to theorize over comparison between a large number of jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2017.723 world-systems that have ever existed. It instantly broadens our horizon in the projection of the current trajectory of world transformation and its future.
For example, Chase-Dunn and his collaborators observe that in many premodern worldsystems, transformation of the system came by through the take-over by some semiperipheral or peripheral marcher state. Such take-over could be transformative, changing the fundamental structure of the world-systems involved. One prominent example is the Mongolian nomadic state in the thirteenth century. It occupied a peripheral or semiperipheral position in the steppe and managed to invade the core zones of most regional world-systems in the medieval times. Such invasion ended the fragmentation of trade routes across Eurasia and integrated different regional systems into a thirteenth-century Eurasian world-system. (Abu-Lughod 1989) Another example is the rise of the sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Manchu semi-nomadic states that invaded the Ming dynasty at the center of the Asian tribute-trade system, establishing the Qing empire that doubled the size of the Ming empire and created a more commercialized economy within the empire and throughout East Asia.
To draw from the insights of these pre-modern pattern of semiperipheral states' transformative takeover of the system, we could ask whether a similar process would emerge at the contemporary capitalist world-system. There have been works suggesting many political and institutional innovations in the modern world-system -such as universal suffrage for women, unpropertied citizens, and minorities -usually first emerged in the semiperiphery before they were adopted in the core and periphery. (Markoff 1996) More recently, increasing attention is paid to the BRICS countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which not only command an increasing share of world GDP, but also become more active and conscious in collaborating with one another to form a power bloc shaping global governance. Besides the regular BRICS summits that started in 2009, these countries also built a multilateral BRICS Development Bank, later known as the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in the Global South. Some other works find that the BRICS group has been taking the lead in transforming the many multilateral institutions they participated in, such as the WTO, by blocking or reshaping the organizations' imperatives dictated by rich countries. (Hopewell 2016 ).
In the meantime, others argue that the BRICS countries are becoming sub-imperial powers that started their colonizing inroad into other peripheral zones like Africa, outcompeting traditional core powers (Bond 2013) . Provided that the BRICS countries are not only economic powerhouses but also politico-military heavyweights mostly independent from the U.S. military umbrella, it is not far fletched to imagine that the BRICS countries will dominate world politics in unison eventually, creating another instance of semiperiphery transformative take-over, or at least overshadowing, of the core. Among the BRICS countries, China is the most economically dynamic one, and it has been a long-time autonomous and formidable military power in Asia too.
jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR. 2017.723 It is natural that the thinking about a BRICS takeover of the world-system would be seen as more or less equivalent to a rising Chinese domination of the system. As such, we are confronted with two possible scenarios of the world-system future: a semiperiphery transformative takeover of the system and a round-two hegemony of the US. Whether these scenarios could become reality depends a great deal on the evolving role of China in the world-system, as China is the single most dynamic and assertive state among the BRICS in the semiperiphery. It is also a state believed by many to be capable of leading the effort to topple U.S. global domination.
China and BRICS: Semiperipheral Challengers to the U.S. Hegemony?
Accompanying the recent economic rise of China, many have purported that the global political center of gravity has been shifting from West to East and from developed countries to developing ones. The book by British writer Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World, is just an example. The persisting economic and military power of the United States is attributable largely to the ongoing status of the U.S. dollar as the most widely used reserve currency and international transaction currency in the world during the last thirty years. The internationally dominant status of the dollar, which many refer to as the "dollar standard," allows the United States to borrow internationally at low interest rates and print money to repay its debt as the last resort. This capability to borrow in its own currency has been allowing the United States to solve many of its domestic economic malaises and maintain the most enormous, active war machine in the world through external indebtedness, while avoiding the kind of debt crises that have wreaked havoc on many developing economies having borrowed in creditors' currency. Ironically, the persistence of the dollar standard is now being maintained by the rise of China as the biggest foreign holder of US-dollar-dominated assets, mainly in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds.
The Dollar Standard and Pax Americana
The post-World War II global hegemonic role of the dollar was sealed in the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, which established the gold convertibility of the dollar under the promised rate of thirty-five dollars for one ounce of gold. The stability of the resulting global monetary order in the 1950s and 1960s was warranted by America's sizable gold reserve, current account surpluses, and its unparalleled competitiveness in the world economy.
The collapse of this Bretton Woods order in 1971 can be traced back to the rising productivity of Europe, West Germany in particular, and Japan following their full recovery from the world war in the late 1960s. Increasing international competition, coupled with the rising wage demand of domestic organized labor and the escalating fiscal and current account deficits incurred by the US's troubled involvement in Vietnam, led to a run on the dollar and the outflow of gold reserves from the US. It left Nixon with few choices but to suspend the gold convertibility of the dollar in 1971, forcing other major capitalist economies to undo their currencies' peg from the dollar. The abolition of gold convertibility allowed the United States to attempt reducing its current account deficit and reviving its economic competitiveness through dollar devaluation.
Upon the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, many predicted the end of dollar hegemony and the rise of a multipolar global economic order grounded on more or less even domination of multiple major currencies such as the yen and Deutsche mark. What is puzzling is that this predicted multipolar moment never came, and the dollar hegemony continued for four more decades until today. Even with the formation of the euro as a competitor, the dollar remains the most widely used reserve currency in the world. Recently, there are a lot of reports about China's activities in using its foreign exchange reserves for "buying the world" through outward foreign direct investment. Chinese companies' acquisition of Volvo Cars from Ford Motor and Chinese SOEs inroad into mining and energy sectors in other developing and developed countries from Zambia to Canada attracts a lot of media attention. But despite these high profile cases, China's outward foreign direct investment is so far of negligible aggregate size, in comparison with other major sources of FDI in the world. The Chinese official statistics show that the stock of China's non-financial outward FDI by the end of 2010 amounted to 298 billion USD (317 billion if financial investment is included). This amount is even smaller than the outward FDI from Singapore, a city-state with a much smaller economy than China. China's outward FDI looks even more insignificant if we take into consideration that 63 percent of that amount was actually FDIs that land in Hong Kong. The stock of China's outward FDI in places other than Hong Kong is less than 118 billion USD, which is less than a tenth of Chinese holding of U.S. Treasury bonds in the amount of about 1.2 trillion at the time. After all, no other market except the U.S. debt market has liquidity deep enough to absorb China's mammoth reserves. Paul Krugman was not exaggerating when he claimed that China had been caught in a "dollar trap," in which it had few choices other than to keep purchasing U.S. Treasury bonds, helping to perpetuate the hegemonic role of the dollar.
Though China has the geopolitical autonomy that theoretically enables it to end its dependence on the dollar and even end the dollar standard, in reality, it has been helping perpetuate the standard, and hence U.S. geopolitical dominance, through its insurmountable addiction to U.S. Treasury bonds caused by its export driven growth. Compared to China's 1.2 trillion holding of U.S. Treasuries, the BRICS bank forex reserve pool of 100 billion and China's pledged contribution of 400 billion is little more than a drop in the ocean.
The Chinese government has been recently emphasizing its ambition to internationalize the RMB into a major reserve and international transaction currency as a way to maintain its exportoriented model while reducing its holding of U.S. dollars, hence curbing its addiction to U.S. public debts. But in actuality, the Chinese RMB, which is not yet a fully convertible currency, has a long way to go to become a major international currency. Its share in international currency use is minuscule, falling way behind the British pound and the yen, even the Mexican peso (see Table  1 ). The RMB's rise to the status of a significant international currency will require RMB's full convertibility, which in turn needs China's financial liberalization. This process will take time, even if the reluctant CCP finally agrees to take the very risky step of fully opening up its banking sector to the global economy. This step is far from an easy choice for the party-state, as such opening would be a blow to its command of the economy via its control of credits. Before such radical shift on the part of China, the talk about the death of the global dollar standard and U.S.
global dominance under a China-led BRICS challenge will be far from reality.
Possible Futures
Of the two possible scenarios of the future of our world-system-a semiperiphery transformative takeover and a second-round hegemony of the United States-as inspired by Chase-Dunn's works on comparative world-systems, we see that the first possibility is not likely for the time being, provided that China, as the most powerful semiperipheral state today, is still tied by the internal contradictions of its developmental model and could not be exonerated from its supporting role behind the staying global dollar standard. It is still possible that in the longer term, China will be able to radically reformulate its model of development, rebalance its economy and fully actualize its potential power to lead other semiperipheral states to prevail and transform the system. Before it happens, China will continue to support the global dollar standard. It is unclear as to whether the jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2017.723 U.S. state would take advantage of the staying power of the dollar to foster the rise of new competitive sectors and formulate new solutions to the crisis of capitalism to turn itself into a second-round hegemony, as Chase-Dunn and others ponder, or it will employ the dollar's power to exacerbate its global military domination and move further to create a coercive US-centered global empire, as presaged by Arrighi. This is going to depend on how the internal contradictions and class conflicts of American capitalism will unfold.
No matter what will be the case, Chase-Dunn's program of comparative world-systems is a liberating perspective that frees us from the rigid conception about possible scenarios of the future according to classical world-system formulations. This research program will continue to stay as an indispensable analytical reference for our understanding of the present and projection of the future in the decades to come. 
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